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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
out earlier the Townsend case relied upon two cases for its authority,
one containing no opinion and the other, although it had an opinion,
antedated the passage of subdivision 6 of Section 4 of the Tax Law.
This latter case while pivoting upon the interpretation of a private
statute incorporating the hospital, did establish clearly the distinction
between taxes and special assessments.' 5 However, it limited the
distinction to what would clearly be special purpose assessments. A
fair reading of the case would never support the Townsend decision
in so far as it validated special assessments which, while for a local
improvement, were collected as general taxes and not apportioned
directly to the benefit received.
In conclusion it is recommended that a new evaluation and dec-
laration of policy be made upon this problem. For the first time the
purpose of the legislature should be fully and openly considered with
respect to the entire purpose of charitable exemptions because at
present it is1iot at all clear that the legislature did not intend a full
exemption.
The entire line of decisions should also be reconsidered towards
the purpose of more clearly categorizing them since many of them
can be distinguished. For example public school district cases should
not be lumped with charitable institutions since they are tax supported
anyway and the problems of both are leagues apart. Secondly, ex-
emptions sought under specific statutes should not be confused with
exemptions sought under the general tax exemption of Section 4 of
the Tax Law. Finally and above all, a definite answer must be made
to the question, is the burden of the special assessment to be levied
in direct proportion to the benefit received. In considering this last,
further clarification must be made as to the method of collection.and
the remoteness as to time of the possible benefit.
H. V. M.
A. P. D.
TAXATION-FAMILY PARTNERSIP.-Respondent, a rancher in
Texas, sold an undivided one-half interest in a herd of cattle to his
four sons taking their promissory notes therefor. A family partner-
ship was formed by the father and his sons, and the boys repaid the
note from their share of the partnership profits. The Commissioner
of Internal Revenue ruled that the entire income from the partner-
ship must be taxed to respondent. The Tax Court sustained the
Commissioner on the grounds that the taxpayer had not satisfied the
requirements for recognition of family partnerships set out by the
United States Supreme Court in the Tower 1 and Lusthaus 2 cases.
15 Roosevelt Hospital v. Mayor, note 4 supra.
1 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280 (1946).
2 Lusthaus v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 327 U. S.' 293 (1946).
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RECENT DECISIONS
The Tax Court stated that these requirements were contribution by
each partner of vital services or of capital originating with that
partner. The Court of Appeals reversed 3 on the ground that
"... the partnership here was actual- real, bona fide, and entered into
for the benefit of the partnership with no thought of income taxes
and no purpose to evade, divide, or defeat their collection." 4
Held, reversed and remanded. Both the Tax Court and the
Court of Appeals erred in their application of the rules laid down
in the Tower 5 and Lusthaus 6 cases.
The court stated, "The question is not whether the services or
capital contributed by a partner are of sufficient importance to meet
some objective standard supposedly established by the Tower case,
but whether, considering all the facts-the agreement, the conduct of
the parties in execution of its provisions, their statements, the tes-
timony of disinterested persons, the relationship of the parties, their
respective abilities and capital contribution, the actual control of in-
come and the purposes for which it is used, and any other facts
throwing light on their true intent-the parties in good faith and
acting with a business purpose intended to join together in the pres-
ent conduct of the enterprise." 7 Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Culbertson, 337 U. S. 733 (1949).
Prior to the decision in this case, the Tax Court of the United
States had decided many family partnership questions solely on the
questions of original capital or vital services. The circumstances in
those cases varied. The court held that a personal service business
where capital was not an important income producing factor was not
a bona fide partnership just because of the contribution by the wife
and son of some capital but no vital services.8 Where services and
capital both were contributed by the wife the court upheld the part-
nership.9 Where a father entered into agreements with his wife and
children, the latter investing' neither capital nor services, the court
found no partnership existed.10 Where a husband transferred to his
wife, one-half interest in assets received by him in the dissolution of a
corporation and they agreed to leave these assets in a partnership to be
formed, the wife taking no active part in the business, the court
found no partnership existed."' A partnership of father and son
wherein the father alone invested capital but both performed vital
3 Culbertson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 168 F. 2d 979 (5th
Cir. 1948).
4 Ibid. at 984.
5 See note 2 supra.
6 See note 3 smtpra.
7 337 U. S. 733, 742 (1949).
8 Harvey v. Commissioner, 6 T. C. 653 (1946).
9 Marks v. Commissioner, 6 T. C. 659 (1946).
10 Durweed v. Commissioner, 6 T. C. 682 (1946).
11 Akers v. Commissioner, 6 T. C. 693 (1946).
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services was upheld for income tax purposes.' 2 A bona fide gift to
a wife which she invested in a partnership without services on her
part was held not enough to support a partnership.13
Since the decision by the Supreme Court in this case, the Tax
Court has been applying this test: "If... it is found that the part-
ners joined together in good faith to conduct a business, having
agreed that the services or capital to be contributed presently by each
is of such value to the partnership that the contributor should par-
ticipate in the distribution of profits, that is sufficient." 14 So that
even where capital invested had been withdrawn, the court found a
bona fide intent to continue the partnership.' 5 Minor capital invested
and unessential services rendered by the wife were considered along
with the method of distribution of profit in determining the bona fides
of a family partnership.'6 Even where the wife worked conscien-
tiously and for long hours, and her services were vital, the partner-
ship was not recognized since the court found no bona fide intent on
her part to become a partner.' 7 No formal agreement is necessary,
if there is a bona fide intent to form the partnership.' 8 Where the
wives of the present partners were brought into the partnership to
bolster the credit standing and the wives performed no services and
contributed no capital, the court held that there was a valid partner-
ship because the intent to form the partnership was present. 19
The trend appears to require an intent of the parties to render
present service to, or investment in, the alleged partnership. The
factors of capital and services are part of the yardstick and no longer
the major consideration in accepting or rejecting the partnership for
income tax purposes.
P. H., JR.
TORTS-LIABILITY FOR PRENATAL INJURIES.-The personal rep-
resentative of an unborn viable child brought an action for the wrong-
ful death 1 of such child caused by the alleged negligence of defendant
hospital. The complaint stated that while the infant's mother was in
12 Runyon v. Commissioner, 8 T. C. 350 (1947).
13 Sandberg v. Commissioner, 8 T. C. 423 (1947).
14 Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U. S. 744, 745 (1949).
'5 Wilson v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. - #57 (1949).
'-1 Cobb v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. - #66 (1949).
17 Funai v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. - #90 (1949).
18 Matuszewski v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. - #96 (1949).
19Delchamps v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. 281 (1949).
'MINN. STAT. ANN. § 573.02. "When death is caused by the wrongful
act or omission of any person or corporation, the personal representative of
the decedent may maintain an action therefor if he might have maintained an
action, had he lived, for an injury caused by the same act of omission."
[ VOL. 24
